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Abstract 
The evaluation of judges’ performance takes place in many ways. Traditionally, there are avenues of 
appeal and legal accountability mechanisms. More recently, ministries of justice and judicial councils 
across Europe have introduced a range of complaints mechanisms, quality assessment procedures and 
other managerial methods of judging judges and the courts within which they operate. This paper reports 
on a study of these mechanisms in nine member countries of the European Union. Our purpose is to 
survey the possible ways in which the judiciary can be evaluated, with a view to improving those practices 
and, ultimately, contributing to a better functioning of the courts. The study focuses on judges within the 
institutional context of courts. The staffs of courts are commonly employed by a ministry of justice or 
some other executive body. A ministry is responsible for allocating funds and accounting to parliament 
for their expenditure. In many European countries (including six of the nine discussed here) the status of 
judges (discipline, promotion, transfer, appointment), and in Denmark and the Netherlands also the 
management of courts, is under the direct responsibility of a judicial council which has substantial 
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Judicial Evaluation in Context: 
Principles, Practices and Promise in Nine European Countries 
 
Richard Mohr* and Francesco Contini** 
 
I. The institutional context of the research 
 
The evaluation of judges’ performance takes place in many ways. Traditionally, there 
are avenues of appeal and legal accountability mechanisms. More recently, ministries of 
justice and judicial councils across Europe have introduced a range of complaints 
mechanisms, quality assessment procedures and other managerial methods of judging judges 
and the courts within which they operate. This paper reports on a study of these mechanisms 
in nine member countries of the European Union. Our purpose is to survey the possible ways 
in which the judiciary can be evaluated, with a view to improving those practices and, 
ultimately, contributing to a better functioning of the courts. 
 
The study focuses on judges within the institutional context of courts. The staffs of 
courts are commonly employed by a ministry of justice or some other executive body. A 
ministry is responsible for allocating funds and accounting to parliament for their expenditure. 
In many European countries (including six of the nine discussed here) the status of judges 
(discipline, promotion, transfer, appointment), and in Denmark and the Netherlands also the 
management of courts, is under the direct responsibility of a judicial council which has 
substantial judicial representation and a degree of independence from the executive 
government.1  
 
With these intertwined responsibilities for staffing and personnel matters and for 
funding and accountability, relationships between judiciaries and ministries are of particular 
                                                
* Legal Intersections Research Centre, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia. 
** Istituto di Ricerca sui Sistemi Giudiziari (CNR) Bologna, Italy.  While this paper is the result of a joint effort 
of the two authors, individual sections may be attributed as follows. Richard Mohr: II, III A, and III C; Francesco 
Contini: I, III B, and IV. 
1 The only countries without judicial councils at the time the study was carried out were Austria and Finland. In 
Belgium, a council was established during our research. While these councils have various names in their 
original languages, all are councils and all refer to judicial power. We use the generic term ‘judicial council’ to 
apply to all those organisations distinct from the ministries which are specifically responsible for the judiciary. 
T. RENOUX, Les Conseils supérieurs de la magistrature en Europe, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1999.  
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relevance to the efficacy and quality of judicial work. Interposing judicial councils has raised 
other questions, or more precisely the old questions of judicial accountability2 in new forms. 
The various ways of approaching these issues are at the heart of this inquiry into the forms of 
evaluation and quality assessment.  
 
We discovered a great variety of approaches to the evaluation of judicial performance, 
some of which are based on the traditional activities of quality control that are already built 
into the institutional practices of courts and justice ministries. The most established and 
effective means of accountability or quality control in justice systems conform to the 
evaluative activities associated with particular institutional bases: the legal base of the 
judiciary and the public administration base of the executive. Our discussion of evaluation 
methods begins with those traditions, while pointing out the limitations of these exercises at 
the systemic level: judges predominantly deal with individual cases, and ministries have a 
limited view of accountability with a focus on finance and efficiency. The apparent barriers to 
reform have prompted us to analyse the theoretical and political foundations of the judicial 
role in its institutional context before describing some of the national experiences.   
 
Evaluation of judges and courts is an aspect of the normal functioning of justice 
systems. Justice ministries account for their use of funds, traditionally simply by monitoring 
the legality of the expenditure.3 Judicial systems have traditionally been characterised almost 
exclusively by legal forms of accountability.4 Courts of appeal are effective in reviewing the 
decisions of lower courts. It appears that difficulties arise at the points of intersection between 
administrative and legal systems. As will become apparent, administrative responses to legal 
demands, and judicial responses to fiscal demands quickly become confused in clashes over 
values such as independence, accountability and justice. More adventurous approaches to 
reform and evaluation can easily be wrecked on these rocks as soon as they are launched. In 
this article we identify opportunities for ministries as well as judiciaries to reinforce their 
legitimacy by using a broader repertoire of evaluation methods, going beyond a purely 
traditional framework.  
                                                
2 J.L. WALTMAN and H.M. HOLLAND, The Political Role of Law Courts in Modern Democracies, London, 
Macmillan,1988. 
3 The origins of public administration are in the inspecting and accounting procedures mainly oriented to 
determining whether public money is spent by courts according to proper procedures.  
4 G. STURGESS and P. CHUBB, Judging the World: Law and Politics in the World’s Leading Courts, 
Richmond, Butterworths, 1988, p. 184. 
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The research we report here has demonstrated the growth of new forms of 
accountability developed to protect and promote other interests and values. On the one hand 
there have been increasing numbers of instances of ministries or judicial councils developing 
measures to promote values such as efficiency or cost control. Program budgeting and 
management by objectives have been introduced to monitor responsiveness to government 
policy initiatives. On the other hand, we find the public has also entered the scene in direct or 
indirect ways. As will be seen in the following pages, there is some evidence that the courts 
and justice systems have begun to listen to public demands, ranging from broad and 
unspecific reforms demanded of the Belgian justice system by the huge protests over the 
Dutroux affair, to the specific proposals for transparent impartiality of the lobby group Court 
Watch in the Netherlands. 
 
The judges and managers are already so attuned to the principles underlying their 
traditional forms of evaluation, and are so deeply associated with the institutions and the roles 
they play in them, that their very expertise can stand in the way of a more systemic or global 
evaluation. By presenting selected cases from nine countries we will demonstrate some of the 
difficulties that have arisen from the tensions between the approaches of the judiciary, the 
executive and the public. However, since the traditional principles, institutions and roles are 
central to the whole system of justice, it will only be possible to find new approaches by 
building upon them. Applying a new discipline, such as total quality management or some 
other discipline imported from private enterprise or the academy, is no substitute for the hard 
work of understanding the foundations of the justice system as the basis for its improvement. 
In France, the international management standards ISO 9000 and ISO 9001 were explored in 
the late 1990s,5 with ephemeral impact. In other cases, generic quality assurance schemes 
sometimes laid the groundwork for more specific elaboration. Portugal and the Netherlands 
both used the model of the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) from 
which to elaborate a set of quality standards.6 The experience of the Netherlands, the country 
having taken this approach furthest, is discussed in more detail below. 
                                                
5 C. DEFFIGIER et al., “Qualité et Justice en France”, in M. FABRI, P. LANGBROEK and H. PAULIAT, 
The Administration of Justice in Europe: Towards the Development of Quality Standards, Bologna, Lo Scarabeo, 
2003, p. 236; M.-L. CAVROIS, H. DALLE and J.-P. JEAN, La qualité de la justice, Paris, La Documentation 
Francaise, 2002, p. 197. 
6 EFQM Excellence Model, http://www.efqm.org/Default.aspx?tabid=35 [accessed  27 September 2005]. 
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To understand and evaluate judicial work within its institutional context, it must be 
assessed in accordance with judicial, executive and public expectations. Given the diverse 
traditions which have led to each of their institutional evaluative methods, it is important to 
find common denominators which relate these systems to each other and which underpin their 
legitimacy and acceptability. The following sections do this by exploring the principles of 
authority and accountability in their traditional application as well as seeking new 
developments in each of these areas. The analysis then considers the legal, managerial, and 
public methods of assessing and directing performance, again in their traditional forms before 
looking for new forms which have developed in the interactions between the various 
institutions and players. Such examples demonstrate the potential development of newer 
forms of accountability and assessment, which might be described as mixed (because they 
embody diverse interests) and cooperative (involving more than one of the institutional 
players working together). These examples are analysed in order to understand ways in which 
the conflicts between the institutional interests have been worked through and 
accommodations have been found. We conclude by analysing the barriers to and conditions 
for the success of innovative forms within the institutional and political context of the courts 
and justice systems.  
 
This discussion draws on the findings of several research projects financed by 
different institutions.7 The projects focussed a common group of researchers and methods on 
the broad research objects of discovering the state of quality evaluation of justice systems in 
Europe. The projects were designed to stimulate a dialogue among the participating 
researchers, who were selected by the project leaders8 through formal and informal networks 
of scholars and practitioners working in this field. This led to the involvement of academics, 
policy makers, public managers and judges with different perspectives on the issues at stake. 
                                                                                                                                                   
NG, G.Y., “Nederland”, in M. FABRI et al., L’administration de la justice en Europe et l’évaluation de sa 
qualité, Paris, Montchrestien, 2005, pp. 305 and 328 [see bibliographical note].  
7 The projects were: “The administration of justice in Europe and the evaluation of its quality”, financed by the 
Agis programme of the European Union; “Case Assignment to courts and within courts”, financed by the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice; and “Internal case allocation in courts”, financed by the Dutch Judicial Council. The 
preparation of this article has been supported by a fourth research project: “The quality of justice in Europe: 
policies, results and institutional settings”, funded by the Italian Ministry of Research and by an International 
Strategic Links Grant from the University of Wollongong, Australia.  
8 The Research Institute on Judicial Systems of the Italian National Research Council (IRSIG-CNR), Bologna, 
and the Institute of Constitutional and Administrative Law at Utrecht University. Project leaders of the project 
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To ensure comparability of the data produced by researchers from such diverse backgrounds, 
a first draft framework for analysis was prepared, and the researchers met to discuss it. Once 
adapted into a final framework, each national team9 prepared a first draft report which, after 






It is necessary to review the key concepts on which justice systems are based before 
considering specific modes of monitoring and assessment. We argue that accountability and 
authority are the key guiding principles of a justice system. While these may be seen as 
embodying the foundations of the legitimacy of the executive and the judiciary respectively, 
neither of these principles stands alone or is an end in itself. Ministries have authority as well 
as judges, and judges too must be accountable. To appreciate their broader context it is 
necessary to consider by what authority a justice system can function, and to whom it is 
accountable. This requires a careful analysis of the notions of accountability and authority, 
which highlights the role of the public. In later discussion we consider how the people 
authorise judicial power and demand accountability of the courts in these European 
democracies. These are fundamental political questions which underpin the evaluation of 
judges.   
 
We begin this analysis by considering the roles played by the judiciary, the executive 
and the public in the traditional methods of evaluating the performance of judges and the 
courts. Existing side by side with the long-standing political and legal principles of authority 
and accountability, there are also well-established methods of assessment embedded in the 
respective systems of the institutional players. The legal system of evaluation used by judges 
focuses on the individual case, applying the law to the facts (to refer to a classic, if 
oversimplified formulation). Executive government traditionally evaluates its performance 
                                                                                                                                                   
“The administration of Justice in Europe and the Evaluation of its quality” were the Mission Droit et Justice of 
the French Ministry of Justice along with the other two Institutes already mentioned.  
9 The researchers were not formal representatives of their countries, or their justice systems. However, we will, 
for reasons of convenience, refer to their reports in brief by the names of the countries concerned. 
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and that of its agencies through the principle and practices of accounting and fiscal 
responsibility: resources are allocated to administrative units which must justify their use, 
either by adhering to spending and accounting procedures or through increasingly 
sophisticated methods for relating outcomes to particular policy areas and funding inputs. The 
public, finally, has its say on how well these systems are functioning, and in promoting 
directions for their future actions, by various structured and unstructured measures, ranging 
from opinion surveys and elections to campaigns, protests and riots.11 
 
These traditional forms of assessment may be broadly mapped onto the three 
underlying “core values” of fairness, democracy and efficiency12 that Sanders identified in a 
critique of an English inquiry into the criminal justice system. There are dangers, however, in 
too close an identification of the institutional players -the judiciary, the public and the 
ministry- with a particular core value. Each of these values is too important and too 
multifaceted to be allocated to a single institutional custodian. If it were, the competition 
between institutional players might be reduced to a competition between values, amounting to 
a sterile and familiar zero sum game. We hope to overcome this deadlock by understanding 
the functioning of the justice system in a broader context. 
 
Justice and the application of the law are based in long-standing traditional principles 
which have been updated by democratic and managerial demands. The contemporary appeals 
to judicial, democratic and managerial values may be traced to a common root in the concept 
of representation. Pitkin explored this notion’s multiple uses in politics starting from its 
etymological root as “the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless 
not present literally or in fact”.13 That is to say, the representative “makes present” an 
abstraction or a collectivity which cannot itself act or make decisions. The modern theory of 
the state, itself a significant abstraction, has organs of government representing “the people”. 
In its pre-democratic form this was a relationship of authority: for Hobbes, for instance, the 
sovereign is authorised to act in the name of the people.  
                                                                                                                                                   
10 M. FABRI et al., L’administration de la justice en Europe et l’évaluation de sa qualité, supra note 6; M. 
FABRI, P.M. LANGBROEK and H. PAULIAT, The Administration of Justice in Europe: Towards the 
Development of Quality Standards, supra note 5.   
11 A. HIRSCHMAN, “Exit, Voice and the State”, World Politics, 1978, No 31, pp. 90-107.  
12 A. SANDERS, “Core Values, the Magistracy, and the Auld Report”, Journal of Law and Society, 2002, No 
29, pp. 324-341. 
13 H.F. PITKIN, The Concept of Representation, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972, pp. 8-9. 
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In its later democratic sense representation is based on accountability, so that the 
representatives of the people can be held accountable for their actions. We generally think of 
representation in this latter sense as the way in which legislatures represent the people. They 
are accountable retrospectively at the next election, while having been authorised at the 
previous election. A representative whose representativeness rests upon accountability is 
“someone who has to be held to account, someone who will have to answer to another for 
what he does”.14 There is a temporal distinction between these two foundations of 
representation: one must be authorised to carry out a particular role before one can do so; one 
is accountable for one’s actions after the event.15  
 
The concept of representation is generally applied to the executive and legislative 
powers. Within the framework of representative democracy the authority of elected 
representatives derives from their election by the people. It is more complex to apply Pitkin’s 
analysis to the judiciary, where we find that judges preserve a pre-democratic version of 
representation as authorisation. In the contemporary world, so thoroughly dominated by 
democratic ideology, this makes them vulnerable to mockery16 and to an even more severe 
erosion of their legitimacy. The prospective authorisation of judges as those who may say the 
law flows from a complex network of processes and sources. While they are selected by 
various authorities (i.e., those authorised to appoint judges) in different jurisdictions, the 
explicit source of that authority is some combination of the law and the people.  
 
The judge may only be appointed through a lawful process and once appointed is the 
authorised interpreter of the law. This is found in a strong form in the common law tradition 
whereby the judge ‘makes’ law by setting precedent, but is also clear in Montesquieu’s notion 
of the judge as bouche de la loi.17 Contemporary French discussions of quality measurement 
                                                
14 Ibid., p. 55. 
15 Ibid., p. 57. 
16 Latour observes that, of all the disciplines, “the law has least suffered the ravages of modernism […] If we so 
often mock the lawyers, it is because they have never really been modern”; B. LATOUR, La fabrique du droit: 
Une ethnographie du Conseil d’État, Paris, La Découverte, 2002, p. 267. 
17 “But the judges […] are only the mouth that pronounces the words of the law” [“ne sont … que la bouche qui 
prononce les paroles de la loi”]; MONTESQUIEU, De l’esprit des lois”, 1748, 
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/montesquieu/de_esprit_des_lois/partie_2/de_esprit_des_lois_2.html  
[accessed 26 May 2006]; MONTESQUIEU, The Spirit of the Laws, transl., [A.M. COHLER et al., Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989], p. 163.  
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continue to see the key function of the judge as being “to pronounce law in an exact and 
reasoned manner”.18 The judge has authority as long as he or she pronounces the law as it 
applies to a specific case. This is ‘legitimate’ in the root meaning of the term, having 
enormous legal content, but little public appeal.19  
 
This pre-modern version of authority is challenged and re-worked by democratic 
regimes, so that before being accountable to the public, judges must be authorised by the 
public as well as by the law. The authorisation of the law and of the people comes together in 
the constitutions of a number of countries where legitimate authority flows from the people. 
This assumption, taken for granted in many democracies, is explicitly written into the 
constitutions of several Latin countries: “Justice is administered in the name of the people”,20 
or “emanates from the people and is administered in the name of the King by judges”.21 
Judicial power is thus formally representative of the people, even if in different ways and 
within specific institutional settings.  
 
We may find further insight into the complex role of the people in the authority 
relations of the courts in another of Pitkin’s distinctions. If the elected representative must be 
responsible to the represented as people with interests, the ‘people’ that the judges represent 
are rather the “unattached interests” of the people in whose name the Constitution authorises 
judges to apply the law.22  As guardian of the law and its proper application, the judiciary can 
be considered to be a representative institution in the sense that it represents those unattached 
interests of equality, consistency and other such guiding principles of the constitution and the 
rule of law.  
 
If both forms of representation persist in the case of the elected representatives, so that 
they must be authorised while being primarily accountable, the role of the people in the 
authorisation of the judges brings with it certain contradictions or confusions. In the judicial 
context the ‘people’ play a dual role. On the one hand they are the authorising source of 
                                                
18 E.E.A. BREEN, “Mesurer la justice? Elaboration d’indicateurs de la qualité de la justice dans une perspective 
comparative”, Paris, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Institut des Hautes Etudes sur la Justice, 2001, http://www.gip-
recherche-justice.fr/recherches/rapports-recherche.htm [accessed 12 October 2005].  
19 J.L. WALTMAN and H.M. HOLLAND, The Political Role of Law Courts in Modern Democracies,  supra 
note 2, p. 1.  
20 Italy, art 101 § 1; Portugal, art. 202 § 1. 
21 Spain, art. 117 § 1. 
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legitimacy for judicial power, either in the strong legal sense of the Latin constitutions or the 
weak common law sense that judicial authority derives from “the confidence of the 
community”.23 The judge acts in the name of the people, who may be considered as an 
abstract or unattached interest. On the other hand the people are parties appearing in court 
before the judge, the very “people with interests” from whom the judge must be aloof to 
maintain impartiality. Thus, the ‘people’ are present in a dual role, both as actually existing 
persons before the court, and as that abstraction which authorises the judge to represent them. 
The judge’s position, at that interface, is identified by Agamben between the ‘people’ as the 
poor and the “popular” masses on one hand, and the sovereign People of the modern 
democracy on the other. In their relations with the public the judiciary must continually 
straddle this fundamental “conceptual pair” of “the original political structure: naked life 
(people) and political existence (People)”.24 
 
Judges may thus be authorised by and even accountable to the People as an 
abstraction, but must be quite detached from actually existing people as parties to the case. 
When real people come before the judge they are subject to authority; they are bound by the 
judicial decision.25 Garapon expresses the ambivalence of the judge to “the paradox of 
publicity, without which there is no justice”, but which at the same time introduces anger and 
irrationality to the courtroom.26 The judges’ complex relationship to the authority of the 
People is consequently tinged on the one hand with a dismissive authority based in law which 
is above “popular opinion” and the interests of the parties before the court, and on the other 
with recognition that the law itself is the will of the People. The judge maintains authority by 
“making present” and speaking in the name of a People who would otherwise only be an 
abstraction.27  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
22 H.F. PITKIN, The Concept of Representation, supra note 13, p. 55. 
23 J. Mc GARVIE, quoted in R.D. NICHOLSON, “Judicial Independence and the Conduct of Media Relations 
by Court”, Journal of Judicial Administration, 1993, No 2, pp. 207-221.  
24 G. AGAMBEN, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2000, 
pp. 30-31. 
25 Pitkin contrasts this authorisation theory with the accountability theory, which sees “precisely the converse”; 
i.e., the representative is bound, while the represented is free [supra note 15]. 
26 A. GARAPON, “Il Rituale Giudiziario”, in A. GIASANTI and G.MAGGIONI, I Diritti Nascosti: 
Approccio Antropologico e Prospettiva Sociologica, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 1995, pp. 289-305. 
27 We have followed Agamben, in the discussion above, in distinguishing the ‘sovereign People’ from ‘people 
with interests’ by use of the capital ‘P’. In the reminder of the article, we will maintain normal use of the lower 
case ‘p’ throughout, distinguishing between these distinct roles of the people by context or clarification. 
Vol.1 EJLS No. 2 10 
To this point we have tried to overcome the unproductive allocation of values among 
institutional players who claim to represent one or the other: fairness to judges, democracy to 
the public and efficiency to the administration. We have sought their common sources of 
authority in a notion of representation by which the people are seen to be represented in 
different ways by ministries and by the judiciary. This analysis offers a means of 
understanding the complex and often difficult relations, which we discuss later, between the 
judiciary, the executive and the public, each one of them vital to the effective operation and 
assessment of the judiciary. However, since authority alone cannot justify or form the sole 




The research carried out in the nine countries identified numerous attempts to 
introduce ‘managerial’ systems to increase the accountability of judges and the courts. These 
were often opposed by the judges who responded that the use of such systems would violate 
the principle of independence. This generates tensions between the divergent values (legality 
versus managerial controls) and conflict among the actors who espouse them (judiciary versus 
executive). In various cases these conflicts led to zero sum games in which a gain by one 
party, for instance in terms of greater managerial efficacy, was seen as a loss by the other (of 
independence). 
 
As will be seen in the instances documented in the following sections, in some 
countries this conflict obstructed processes of reform while in others we have been able to 
observe constructive feedback and positive sum games. In the latter cases interactions among 
the various actors promoting different values and interests have led to creative solutions, not 
only in terms of greater efficiency and improved management of the judicial system, but also 
in reinforcing certain values specific to that system, such as impartiality. By analysing such 
cases we try to identify possible approaches to unlock the traditional tensions between 
independence and accountability.28 Approaching this issue first from the point of view of 
accountability, we have been forced to reconsider the ways in which debates on quality and 
                                                
28 J. DOUGLAS and R. HARTLEY, “The Politics of Court Budgeting in the States: Is Judicial Independence 
Threatened by the Budgetary Process?”, Public Administration Review, 2003, No 63, pp. 441-453.; American 
Bar Association, “An Independent Judiciary: Report of the ABA Commission on Separation of Powers and 
Judicial Independence”, 1997, http://www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judiciary/report.html [accessed 17 May 2006].  
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the functioning of the judiciary have conceived of accountability. While traditionally the 
judiciary has focused on the discretion and political choices involved in judicial decision-
making,29 more recently managerial approaches have been introduced, which are seen as 
instruments of managerial control.30 By distinguishing between the methods of evaluation 
traditionally associated with the executive and those legal methods associated with the 
judiciary, we hope to clarify an increasingly “amorphous concept”.31  
 
Accountability is the combination of methods, procedures and forces determining 
which values are to be reflected in administrative decisions.32 If, as is commonly held, public 
officials acting in the name of or on account of the State are responsible to the citizens for 
their actions, accountability becomes the instrument which expresses this responsibility.33 
This is characterised by a mass of formal and institutional procedures as well as by various 
unanticipated intrusions from political and social forces making claims and demanding 
responses in ways which are both unprogrammed and unprogrammable.  
 
Accountability can thus be characterised on the one hand as those systems which instil 
the values and interests of the appropriate stakeholders34 within organisational behaviour. On 
the other hand, accountability can be characterised as the ‘mechanisms’ by which one can 
analyse or assess whether the organisation builds those values and interests into its own 
actions and decisions. In this way accountability can be considered as a two way channel of 
communication. First, it must convey information about the functioning of the organisation to 
those having the right to know. This information may include its objectives, its fundamental 
values, and the interests it is dedicated to protecting.  Second, it must provide for methods and 
techniques to ensure that the members of the organisation act consistently with those values 
                                                
29 G. STURGESS and P. CHUBB, Judging the World: Law and Politics in the World’s Leading Courts, supra 
note 4, p. 4. 
30 NCSC, “Trial Court Performance Standard and Measurement System”, 2001,  
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/tcps/index.html, accessed on 6 June, 2006; NCSC, “Court Tools”, 2006, 
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/CourTools/tcmp_courttools.htm [accessed on 30 May 2006].  
31 A. LE SUEUR, “Developing Mechanisms for Judicial Accountability in the UK”', Legal Studies, 2004, No 
24. 
32 H.A. SIMON, D.W. SMITHBURG and V.A. THOMSON, Public Administration, New York, Knopf, 1961, 
p. 513.  
33 Ibid., p. 513. 
34 By this, we mean those stakeholders who have legitimate interests in and expectations of the organisation and 
its actions.  
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and interests. Thus, accountability is that complex of means which reinforce the responsibility 
of public actors.  
 
It is evident that the concept of accountability, defined inclusively as above, cannot be 
limited simply to verifying productivity or efficiency, but includes a broader complex of 
values which public organisations must adopt based on the fundamental values of democratic 
regimes. These include legality, equality and impartiality. This inclusive notion of 
accountability is at a different and perhaps higher level than the individual values specific to a 
single unit of public administration. Accountability is conceived of in such a way as to enable 
the democratic process of establishing respect for those values, whether of efficiency or 
independence, efficacy in achieving objectives, or impartiality in the treatment of citizens. 
 
From this point of view neither the judicial system as a whole nor any particular court 
or individual judge can be seen to be above the demands of accountability. There must be 
some channels of checking and transparency in order that each may account for their actions. 
The difficulties arise in understanding which forms or mechanisms of accountability are 
compatible with and appropriate to the functions of the judges, the courts, the judicial councils 
and the ministries of justice. To do without them would lead to a judicial system whose 
absolute independence would be difficult to reconcile with the fundamental values of 
democratic and representative regimes. 
 
Even those control systems that have been developed throughout the law’s long 
history in order to ensure the legality of judicial procedures represent forms of this broad 
concept of accountability. Measures such as reasoned decisions, public trials and channels of 
appeal are available to check whether the judicial processes respect substantive and important 
values and interests such as impartiality and legality. The role of these measures as 
foundations of a specifically legal system of evaluation or quality assurance is discussed in the 
next section. They represent the traditional approach to accountability which has been 
developed in the legal environment to promote certain important interests and values which 
should underlie judicial evaluation. There is, however, a broader range of interests and values 
to be served. 
 
Following a discussion of the traditional forms of legal accountability, we trace the 
development of other forms of accountability which may be described as managerial and 
Vol.1 EJLS No. 2 13 
public. From this point of view the tensions commonly generated by the introduction of any 
new form of accountability may be seen as unavoidable if justice systems are to incorporate 
means of assessing their performance based on a broader range of values and interests than 
those of a narrow legal tradition. It may also be seen that each of these demands for 
accountability come from specific interests and may itself be one dimensional unless it can be 






Judges have a long history and experience of internal evaluative mechanisms as means 
for testing claims and determining rights and wrongs, based on law and the appellate process. 
Indeed, the very raison d’être of the judiciary is assessment, based on particular values 
associated with justice and the law, such as fairness and the impartial and proper application 
of established law. In addition to these values, it is important also to consider the institutional 
context in and through which the judiciary operates. 
 
This environment includes the court registry where files are kept for each case and 
where the key procedural events are recorded and organised. These practices and files 
constitute the memory of the proceedings, making it possible to retrace the steps, the acts and 
events and so providing the means to check that proper procedure and law have been applied 
in every case.35  
 
The institutional context also includes legal and conventional principles which are so 
strongly institutionalised that they are taken for granted without necessarily being codified. 
These include giving reasons for decisions, and the principle of the public trial which brings 
the public and the media (excluding cameras and microphones in some jurisdictions) into the 
heart of the judicial process.36 These too are means of checking that the judicial process has 
been fair and just. The reasoned decision records the law and the facts relevant to the case and 
                                                
35 The law “protects all the traces of disengagement to tirelessly reattach, by the perilous tracks of the signature, 
the archive, the text, the file, the statements to their speakers” [les énoncés à leurs énonciateurs]; B. LATOUR, 
La fabrique du droit: Une ethnographie du Conseil d’État, supra note 16, p. 297. 
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how these led to the result.37 As to the records of events and decisions, these assume a 
particular significance in the context of the appellate system which is the most important 
evaluation mechanism within the juridical framework. 
 
The assessment of cases according to procedural law applies not only to the court’s 
assessment of the specific case but, through the appellate process, may also be seen to reflect 
back on the courts themselves. In other words, each court must assess the cases before it, but 
since every decision is potentially open to appellate challenge, the court itself is liable to 
assessment. However, deliberations at each stage of the process are directed to specific cases 
and have few repercussions at the systemic level; i.e., decisions overturned on appeal are only 
that: decisions in specific cases, and not evaluations of the judge making the original decision.  
 
The nine countries considered here had implemented a variety of other measures for 
the assessment of individual judges and courts. These included internal complaints 
mechanisms, criminal and/or civil liability, and some versions of an ombudsman system. 
Without assessing the efficacy of these systems, which are of course only as good as the 
procedures and practices for implementing them, we simply comment here on some of the 
complex interactions between the legal and other principles and systems at work in judging 
the judges. Complaints mechanisms in France and Spain have received some 2,000 and 1,000 
complaints per year (respectively), but limited evaluative data suggests that very rarely have 
these resulted in action against a judge. What is of particular interest here is that the 
complaints are overwhelming about unjustifiable delay (France) and the only two cases of 
sanctions against judges in Spain were in response to very serious delay.38 This is an area 
which is susceptible to both legal and administrative assessment, as will be seen in more detail 
below, but which is fundamentally a quantitative measure of time lapse. The very limited 
number of cases resulting in sanctions suggests that it is difficult for citizens to take action 
against judges through a disciplinary system controlled (as in both these cases) by the 
judiciary. That successes have been limited to matters involving delay suggests that this is the 
                                                                                                                                                   
36 A. LE SUEUR, “Developing Mechanisms for Judicial Accountability in the UK”, Legal Studies, supra note 
31, pp. 80-81. 
37 We will deal in more detail with the principles underlying publicity and transparency when we come to the 
topic of public means of assessment and accountability. 
38 C. DEFFIGIER et al., “France”, in M. FABRI, L’administration de la justice en Europe et l’évaluation de sa 
qualité, Paris, Montchrestien, 2005, p. 268; C. DEFIGGER et al., supra note 5, pp. 152-153. 
Vol.1 EJLS No. 2 15 
major concern of court users (for which there is some corroborating evidence)39 and also that 
it is one of the few areas in which disciplinary committees can or will find against judges.  
 
The experience of introducing an ombudsman in the Netherlands and in Austria has 
been particularly interesting with regard to the line between legal and administrative or 
publicly-driven procedures. In the Netherlands complaints may only go to the ombudsman 
after they have been dealt with internally by the courts. Even this involvement of an 
ombudsman is intended as a temporary solution only while more internal checks are 
implemented by the courts themselves. In order to preserve the independence of the judicial 
procedure, on-going proceedings may never be investigated by the ombudsman.40 Similar 
provisions exist in Austria to avoid any possible interference in an on-going matter. These 
have extended to preclude the ombudsman investigating any judicial proceeding other than 
administrative cases. Having originally argued that “the scheduling of hearings is a function 
of court administration”, and thus within his domain, it has been decided that the Austrian 
ombudsman may not investigate any judicial proceedings.41 
 
These brief comments on attempts to introduce innovative elements into the 
assessment procedures of the legal system indicate some of the difficulties involved in 
relating the assessment process to the performance of the judicial system or the judge rather 
than to the outcome in an individual case. As some of these instances suggest, insulating the 
judges from outside influences during the course of a trial is among the most deeply held 
principles in the legal system. Where this issue may be open to challenge is at that point after 
a trial where action may be appropriate retrospectively, and at the interface between judicial 
and administrative matters characterised by delays in decisions and in the scheduling of 
hearings. In these matters the judiciary closes ranks and insists that due to their being of a 
judicial nature, any outside involvement would transgress the principle of judicial 
independence.42 
 
                                                
39 This is discussed below in relation to surveys of court users. 
40 Ng, supra note 9, pp. 310-311. 
41 G.E.KODEK and M. STELZER, “Quality and Justice in Austria” in M. FABRI, P.M. LANGBROEK and 
H. PAULIAT, The Administration of Justice in Europe: Towards the Development of Quality Standards, 
Bologna, Lo Scarabeo, 2003, pp. 14-15. 
42 More could be said about the transparency of these processes and the importance of evaluating them, but that 
would require more specific investigations than those we are reporting on here. 
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The legal processes of quality control through judicial and appellate processes are 
generally so well established and so deeply ingrained in the nation’s constitution and laws that 
they are almost invisible from the point of view of quality assessment in relation to reforms. 
Where they have been conspicuous is in the jurisprudence that has grown out of decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). A number of the countries reported that 
decisions involving appeals under Article 6 (right to a fair trial) of the European Convention 
of Human Rights had repercussions for the quality assurance of their justice systems. Article 
6(1) includes the provision that “everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.  
 
Findings that trials had exceeded “a reasonable time” were more commonly cited than 
any of the other grounds, reflecting the pattern of complaints reported above. Finland, priding 
itself on average handling times of 2 to 13 months, was “surprised” by an ECHR finding of 
excessive delay (3 years) in an appeal case, but this was seen as a statistical “outlier” and no 
systemic approach was taken to address delay.43 The report from France also notes successful 
appeals to the ECHR on grounds of exceeding reasonable time, and of the independence and 
impartiality of the judges (the relations between the prosecutors and the court). In these and 
other cases the Cour de cassation has taken steps to ensure future compliance.44 From 2000 to 
2005 Finland had among the fewest appeals to the ECHR on the grounds of delay, while 
France was at the opposite pole.45 
 
The capacity of ECHR decisions to go beyond the individual case to influence the 
overall functioning of the judicial system depends on the particular institutional setting in 
which it is located. Various agencies of the Council of Europe (COE), notably the Committee 
of Foreign Ministers of Member States, have responsibility for overseeing compliance with 
decisions of the Court and monitoring the adequacy of measures taken by national judicial 
systems to avoid repetition of such violations.46  
 
                                                
43 A. AARNIO et al., “Quality and Justice in Finland”, in M. FABRI, P. LANGBROEK and H. PAULIAT, 
The Administration of Justice in Europe: Towards the Development of Quality Standards, Bologna, Lo Scarabeo, 
2003, p. 209.  
44 C. DEFFIGIER, supra note 38, pp. 267-268. 
45 Authors’ analysis of cases brought before the ECHR under Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, from 2000 until 2005. 
46 F. BUONOMO, “Nuove regole per l’adempimento delle sentenze CEDU”, Diritto e Giustizia, 2005.  
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This approach has demonstrated its capacity to produce systemic changes which may 
not necessarily be desirable. The Italian case illustrates this point. Until 2000 Italy was the 
country with the highest number of appeals and violations on the grounds of excessive delay 
in court proceedings, whose sheer number were practically blocking the decision-making 
capacity of the ECHR. Consequently the Committee of Foreign Ministers asked the Italian 
government to take steps to speed up judicial proceedings and to reduce the number of 
appeals to the court. Even if the Italian government was not able to achieve satisfactory results 
in case processing times, it was able to reduce appeals to the Court, thanks to passage of the 
so-called ‘Pinto’ legislation.47 This placed a judge within the courts of appeal to hear appeals 
against excessive delay and also provided for compensation. Thus before being able to appeal 
to the ECHR, a claim must first be screened by the Italian judicial system which may 
eventually offer compensation. It is clear that this system treats the symptoms rather than the 
disease, thus it has reduced the number of appeals to Strasbourg but not the length of trials.48 
The COE and the Council of Foreign Ministers nonetheless keeps the Italian judicial system 
under observation, requesting annual reports and action plans on the state of justice in order to 
examine the results in delay reduction. 
 
This follow through on findings of the ECHR to interventions at the systemic level 
represents a stimulating exception rather than the rule. The legal decision, whether in a first 
instance court or on appeal, is a prospective order applied to a specific case. The prime goal of 
the judicial system is to uphold the authority of the law by ensuring the recognition of the 
judicial decision. It is through this recognition that the law reaches beyond the confines of the 
legal system itself, to the other branches of government and to the public. However the judges 
have few opportunities and fewer formal channels through which to gauge the efficacy of 
their authority. In legal terms it can only be assured through conformity with the procedures 
and substance of formal law, subject to checking by the mechanism of the appeal. If an appeal 
points to systemic failures, as in this Italian example, the judges’ interest in maintaining 
authority suggests prospective legal action. This distinguishes it from accountability which 
can also act retrospectively.  
 
                                                
47 2001 Law No 89. 
48 D.CARNEVALI, “La violazione della ragionevole durata del processo: Alcuni dati sull’applicazione della 
Legge Pinto”, in C.GUARNIERI and F. ZANNOTTI, Giusto Processo?, Padova, CEDAM, 2006.  
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More commonly judicial decisions do not have systemic implications. Legal 
accountability is not limited to the purely procedural aspects we have been discussing above. 
In every legal system there exists disciplinary responsibility with more or less effective 
procedures,49 which enable them to be checked, and also provide a type of fiscal 
accountability which is usually limited to ensuring that processes for spending and recording 
expenditure conform to formal requirements. The legal processes which ensure conformity to 
the law reflect the importance the judiciary places on protecting and reinforcing the 
fundamental principles and authority of the rule of law, but tell us little about how they utilise 
the resources that the State makes available to them. The many attempts to introduce systems 
of managerial accountability are a response to this need. They include a wider range of checks 




All nine of the countries considered here have tried to introduce systems of managerial 
accountability into their justice systems. The results have not always been satisfactory.  
 
Rather than try to give a full account of these attempts we will describe only some of 
them in order to identify the distinctive features of such an approach. We will note certain 
tensions between these new approaches and the purely legal methods traditionally applied to 
courts before trying to analyse some of the difficulties. 
 
As organs of executive government answerable to the legislature, ministries are the 
bearers of a culture and a tradition of accountability and responsible government. As such 
they must ensure that public funds are spent appropriately, and they also have responsibility 
for policy implementation. This is also true of those judicial councils (such as the Dutch)50, or 
court services (such as the Danish) that allocate human and financial resources to courts and 
are answerable to the parliament or to the ministry for this function.51 Policies implemented 
                                                
49 See the discussion above on the limited effectiveness of judicial discipline; also G. DI FEDERICO, 
Recruitment, Professional Evaluation and Career of Judges and Prosecutors in Europe, Bologna, Lo Scarabeo, 
2005. 
50 P. LANGBROEK, “Changing the Judiciary and Judicial Administration: The Netherlands and Guatemala”, in 
Empowerment, Security and Opportunity through Law and Justice, Saint Petersburg, World Bank, 2001. 
51 This is not the case for the Latin judicial councils -Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal-, that are only in charge 
of recruitment, appointment, promotion, training and discipline of judges.  
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by these organisations in relation to courts range from those areas close to judicial decision-
making, such as the establishment of time standards for handing down decisions, to areas 
involving administrative and support services (e.g., those which are increasingly provided to 
victims of crime). The line between judicial decisions and managerial responsibility is well 
understood in theory, but in practice there are numerous points of contact and, potentially, 
conflict.  
 
Before considering examples of this contested territory, it is worth commenting on an 
important difference in perspective. While judges, as noted above, deal in decisions in specific 
cases, managers deal in aggregates. Even those conscientious managers who understand and 
measure case processing times with care and attention can be surprised, as were the Finnish 
team, when an individual case is overturned for excessive delay by the ECHR. To the 
manager or the statistician, this is an ‘outlier’, an extraordinary piece of data which simply 
disrupts normal calculations. To the court, this is an injustice which must be remedied in the 
specific case. The gulf between the judicial and the managerial cultures may be illustrated by 
further examples from the study.  
 
Following the wave of interest in the “new public management”,52 recent approaches 
initiated by government agencies such as ministries and judicial councils seek to understand 
and evaluate the judicial system in terms of outputs (such as the number of cases resolved). 
They can even be designed to put pressure on judges and staff to achieve specific objectives, 
in the style of management by objectives (MBO).  
 
For instance in Finland the Ministry of Justice53 has collaborated with the court offices 
to introduce systems of MBO that apply both to the individual judge (still being trialled) as 
well as at the national level, following the introduction of this approach across the whole 
national public administration54 in 1995. The system assesses the courts’ performance using 
indicators of their productivity, economy and efficacy. Productivity is calculated in terms of 
the number of decisions per judge or per unit of administrative staff. The principal indicator of 
the economy or efficiency of the courts is the cost per decision, calculated by dividing the 
                                                
52 H. WOLLMANN, Evaluation in Public Sector Reforms: Concept and Practices in International Perspective, 
Cheltenham, Elgar, 2003. 
53 Finland does not have a judicial council or equivalent body. 
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annual budget of a particular court by the number of decisions made by its judges. The 
calculation of efficacy is more complex. It is based on the assumption that the length of 
proceedings is fundamental to the judicial process and the rights of the citizens. Consequently 
case processing times are taken as the key measure of efficacy.55 
 
Even though these indicators were developed in order to allocate resources to 
particular court offices, their use for this purpose does not follow automatically. The 
indicators instead form a source of knowledge on which to base discussion around the 
negotiation of the budget of each individual court. They are also used during annual meetings 
to help the Ministry of Justice and the heads of each court office to define the objectives to be 
met. Although this soft approach should allow even handed negotiation between competing 
values, it has been criticised by the judiciary. Some have argued that the definition of 
objectives by officials of the Ministry would violate judicial independence which is protected 
by the Constitution. Others maintain that with the introduction of the system of management 
by results the judge’s attention would shift to the number of cases and their processing times, 
thus reducing the quality of the decisions.56 It was also suggested that the system of 
measurable objectives could not be implemented by the courts. The Ministry of Justice 
replied: 
 
“The judiciary through its management by results system may not interfere with the objective and 
subjective independence of the courts in their decision making and other application of the law, which is 
the real essence of the independent judicial power safeguarded in the constitution. The fact that general 
information about handling times, […] is written in documents of courts dealing with management by 
results does not in itself lessen or endanger the independence of the court in reaching a decision in 
individual court cases”. 57 
 
The Finnish Ministry of Justice’s gentle and collaborative approach, while avoiding 
open conflict between the judiciary and the executive, may nonetheless provoke a judicial 
reaction. The executive’s introduction of a system of management by results that emphasises 
the courts’ productivity and efficiency promotes values and interests identified as managerial. 
                                                                                                                                                   
54 P. UUSIKYLÄ and P. VIRTANEN, “Public Sector Performance Contracting in Finland”, Paris, OECD, 
1999. 
55 A. AARNIO et al., “Finland”, in M. FABRI et al., L’administration de la justice en Europe et l’évaluation de 
sa qualité, Paris, Montchrestien, 2005, pp. 231-232. 
56 Aarnio supra note 43., pp. 176.  
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This has the potential to create equal and opposite reactions from the judiciary who for their 
part emphasise the legal and normative values of the judicial process. In this situation zero 
sum games may arise between the judiciary and the executive so that the final outcome 
depends almost exclusively on the relative strengths of the main players.  
 
The introduction of management by objectives in Italy has led directly to the 
realisation of this concern. In this case, instead of starting with instruments to evaluate the 
functioning of the judicial system, or of the individual office, the new system set out to 
evaluate the results achieved by the managers of each court office, with consequences for their 
remuneration and career prospects. These did not cover the work of the court’s chief judge. In 
practice, each office manager must, after a ‘frank discussion’ with the chief judge, define the 
organisational objectives to be met.58 It is taken for granted that these objectives do not 
include the outputs of the whole court, for example the number of civil cases to be dealt with 
in the current year, on the grounds that this would violate judicial independence. Instead the 
objectives are exclusively those of the individual managers and their limited areas of 
responsibility. In contrast, the chief judge, who has the broader responsibility for the whole 
court’s performance, is completely excluded from the evaluation process. Consequently the 
objectives defined by the manager are strictly limited to administrative tasks such as reducing 
filing backlogs and are marginal to the legal and managerial objectives, like reducing the cost 
per judicial decision. Clearly responsibility for objectives of this type must fall squarely on 
both the heads of the individual court: the judicial and the administrative managers. In order 
to evaluate the court’s management, the results achieved by both managers must be 
considered together as in the Dutch case.59 
 
The Italian Ministry’s decision to limit its MBO-driven evaluation to the 
administrative managers could be interpreted as a strategy of stealth which first attacks the 
point of least resistance (the administrators). After that position was consolidated one could 
extend it to the judiciary. However, we have seen no trace of any argument which would 
support that interpretation. The Ministry’s official explanation seems instead to rely on the 
necessity of developing an adequate information system to allow monitoring of the objectives 
                                                                                                                                                   
57 Ibid., pp. 177. 
58 M. FABRI et al., “Quality and Justice in Italy”, in M. FABRI, P. LANGBROEK and H. PAULIAT, The 
Administration of Justice in Europe: Toward the Development of Quality Standards, Bologna, 2003, p. 278. 
59 NG, G.Y., Quality of judicial organisation and checks and balances, Utrecht, Intersentia, 2007, p. 110. 
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of each court office before extending the system of MBO. More precisely, the system should 
“provide in real time an up to date picture of the on-going progress in order to permit timely 
intervention to minimise the divergence between the stated [objectives] and the current 
situation”.60 Maintaining that this statistical information system is a prerequisite to further 
extension of the evaluation appears to be little more than a technocratic excuse.  
 
As we saw in the Finnish experience, a system of MBO can be based on a small 
amount of essential data. This need not be considered as an objective representation of the 
‘true’ functioning of the court office, but as base line information from which to negotiate 
budgets and objectives. Instead the one-sided Italian solution clearly reflects the logic and the 
power relations of the particular historic moment. The Ministry of Justice has not yet seen fit 
to extend this system to the chief judges because this would have led to a battle they could not 
have won. This is why the system has focused purely upon the weakest link in the chain: the 
administrative managers of the court office.  
 
Instead of opening a broad discussion among the various institutional, social and 
political interests, the Ministry used technocratic means to tackle the problem internally. This 
involved a search for “informatic solutions” deemed indispensable to the development of the 
system, which simply put off the need to define its essential elements: its legitimate 
objectives, who was to identify them, and the link between outcomes and financial 
allocations. This may take into account not only allocations to court offices as a whole, but 
also the remuneration and selection of the heads of those offices. These crucial questions must 
be confronted to avoid a purely ritualistic use61 of this management tool. 
 
Austria and Spain have developed ways of measuring output relating cases to numbers 
of judges. The Austrian approach is based in the Ministry’s computerised personnel 
information system and can be used to calculate the number of judges needed in particular 
courts.62 The Spanish measures were developed by the Judicial Council and are intended as a 
                                                
60 F. PIANTELLI, “La programmazione strategica e gli strumenti di gestione: Esperienze a confronto”, 2005, 
http://www.giustizia.it/newsonline/data/multimedia/685.pdf [accessed on 30 may 2006], p. 2.  
61 J.MEYER and B. ROWAN, “Institutionalized Organisations: Formal Structures as Myth and Ceremony”, 
American Journal of Sociology, 1977, pp. 340-363.  
62 G.E. KODEK and M. STELZER, “Quality and Justice in Austria”, in M.FABRI, P.M.LANGBROEK and 
H. PAULIAT, The Administration of Justice in Europe: Towards the Development of Quality Standards, 
Bologna, Lo Scarabeo, 2003, p. 15; P. BAUER, “A Show Case for the Future: e-Justice in Austria”, in 
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means of rewarding judges according to their productivity, offering bonuses or penalties of up 
to 10% of salary.63 Unsurprisingly there has been substantial resistance to the principle of 
paying judges according to the number of cases they process.  
 
As far as we know this is one of the few such systems to have been applied to the 
judiciary. As in the Austrian case, the Spanish system has been used originally to establish the 
number of judges and staff needed in different courts. The system, based on so-called ‘output 
measures’ (módulos de dedicación) was quite rough and gave only a broad indication of the 
number of cases that each office could realistically process. The system was criticised by the 
judiciary on the grounds that the measures did not take into account weightings for different 
types of cases.64  
 
In 1997 the Spanish Judicial Council65 collected the various critiques in a ‘white 
paper’ which also proposed means of refining the output measures. Groups of expert judges 
developed new measures calculating the average times it took judges to dispose of various 
types of cases. In 2000 new output measures were approved that, since 2003, have been used 
to determine the judges’ needs and also affect their remuneration. In practice, those judges 
who deal with at least 20% more cases than the module anticipates receive additional 
remuneration (from 5 to 10% of their salary). The Judicial Council has decided that for now it 
will not use the modular system also to sanction the less productive judges by reducing their 
salaries.66 Not surprisingly, the introduction of this remuneration system has drawn strong 
criticism from the Spanish judges. Two of the judges’ associations, even though they accept 
the need to evaluate the judiciary, consider the system insufficiently reliable to form a basis 
for remuneration. A third association has been far more radical in its critique, calling the 
system “productivity-focussed and mean” and incompatible with judicial activity. Despite 
these strong criticisms, the Judicial Council continues to apply the measures to determine a 
performance based salary, and is working to improve the methodology. Recently, a 
consultancy firm has produced a new system to record the productivity of judges which 
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should permit a more comprehensive evaluation of their work. The new system is much more 
complex. It is based on several clusters of indicators covering five areas of judicial activity: 
efficacy, quality, timeliness, commitment and professional development.67  
 
In 2006 the Tribunal Supremo decided that the law which established the módulos 
(15/2003) contravened articles 402 and 403 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial requiring 
the state to guarantee the economic independence of the judiciary, and to base judicial 
remuneration on objective, equitable and transparent principles.68 Consequently the módulos 
are no longer applied.  
 
France has embarked upon a far more ambitious programme to link budgets to results. 
The Loi organique relative aux lois de finances (1 August 2001) was a national initiative of 
the legislature which applied to all ministries: they were required to submit budgets according 
to missions and programmes, whose objectives and results were to be examined by Parliament 
as part of the financial allocation process. The Justice Ministry responded with ten objectives, 
each with indicators of the courts’ success in achieving them, under the headings of socio-
economic efficacy (e.g., access, involvement with victims), quality of service (e.g., delay 
reduction, sentencing options) and effective management (case listing).69 The debate in France 
now concerns the appropriateness of the objectives and indicators, rather than the principle of 
budgetary accountability on which the law is based.70 However, since the objectives and 
indicators were developed by the Ministry without any transparent process or the involvement 
of the judiciary, it has been suggested that opposition to the law may focus on concerns over 
independence.71 
 
In the Netherlands the process of developing measures of quality was developed in 
conjunction with the establishment of a Judicial Council. On its establishment in 2002 the 
Council was made responsible for distributing resources within the judicial system. A 
“program to strengthen the organisation of the judiciary” was established as a judicial 
                                                
67 Ibid., p. 9. 
68 Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo contencioso-administrativo, pleno, sentencia, Votación, 21 Feb. 2006.  
69 C. DEFFIGIER, supra note 38, p. 269; NG, G.Y., Quality of Judicial Organisation and Checks and 
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initiative, and it was this group which developed quantitative measures of cases, personnel 
and time, originally based on the EFQM model (mentioned at the outset) and updated through 
regular research. These measures, together with planning proposals from the courts 
responsible for their implementation, now form the basis of annual resource allocation.72 
While the Justice Ministry had been reluctant to impose accountability on the courts, to avoid 
perceptions of interference with judicial independence, the accountability has been devolved 
to the link between the judicial council and the judges even though the Minister is still 
responsible to Parliament under the Constitution.73 According to the documents made 
available to the quality of justice project there seems to be little substantive difference 
between the measures used by the French and the Dutch systems. Indeed, with their emphasis 
on policy areas as diverse as victim support and alternatives to custodial sentencing, the 
French measures may be less rigid, technocratic and econometric than those developed in the 
Netherlands. The difference, according to the judicial critique, derives from the source of the 
values that are embodied in the measures: the ministry or the judiciary. Judicial reactions have 
had more to do with process than results. 
 
The Dutch, Austrian, Italian and Spanish measures considered here are internal 
management systems which do not achieve external transparency and which were criticised 
(in the Spanish case) for confounding cases of different degrees of complexity. Whether 
developed by a judicial council or a justice ministry, to the extent that they have been 
successfully introduced, they signal the growing force of a managerial approach to the 
administration of the courts.  
 
The systems of managerial accountability in the participating countries include a 
number of more or less rigorous mechanisms for evaluating the functioning of the judicial 
system. These organisational management evaluations have consequences, either at the level 
of the allocation of resources to various courts and court offices (Austria, France, the 
Netherlands and Spain) or in some cases for the remuneration of personnel (administrative 
managers in Italy, judges in Spain). These instances highlight some of the differences between 
legal and managerial forms of accountability. Evaluations deriving from models of managerial 
                                                                                                                                                   
71 J.-P. JEAN and D. MARSHALL, “Francia: Un controverso progetto per migliorare il servizio giustizia”, 
Questione Giustizai, 2005, pp. 591-610, at pp. 594-595. 
72 NG, supra note 6, pp. 310-311. 
73 Ibid., p. 308. 
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accountability conceive the relevant unit of analysis as aggregated data rather than the 
individual case. Their methodologies are thus statistical or economic and their evaluation 
criteria are no longer established by the norms of the legal system but by the authority with 
overall responsibility for managing the justice system: a justice ministry or a judicial council. 
Judicial councils, as organisations of the judges themselves, have been more ambitious (in 
Spain) and more successful (in the Netherlands) in introducing managerial measures of the 
judicial process. In either case, the values and interests which are protected and supported are 
principally those of efficiency and efficacy in achieving internally defined objectives.  
 
We can draw some tentative conclusions from the managerial forms of evaluation 
considered above. The first point to note is that the cost of using these systems is directly 
related to their complexity. The Italian and Spanish cases indicate, albeit in different ways, a 
worrying tendency to make the means of monitoring activity ever more complex and 
fragmented and, therefore, costly.74 This may be due to the technical difficulty involved in 
measuring such complex and multi-faceted tasks as those of the judge. It may also derive to 
some extent from the judges’ dissatisfaction with the type of knowledge which is produced by 
these systems. As we noted above, managerial systems operate at the level of aggregated and 
general data, rather than those individual cases on which the judge must focus.  
 
In the face of the conflicting approaches to professional practice of the manager and 
the judge, monitoring systems acquire more and more layers of analysis, each one adding to 
the complexity and fragmentation of the one before. As long as these fundamentally different 
approaches are treated in a technocratic manner, the diverse underlying means of 
understanding the job of the courts are unlikely to be reconciled. Rather, the problem becomes 
more acute as the economic and statistical knowledge produced diverges ever further from the 
way in which judges’ usually understand their role, as arbiters in the individual case.  
 
The above discussion has nonetheless shown at least one way in which the problem 
may be rendered less acute. The Finnish case shows the potential benefit of treating the data 
produced by the managerial systems as a foundation for discussion in a collaborative process, 
                                                
74 United States experience indicates how quickly such measurement systems can become so complex and 
onerous that they become almost impossible to use, promoting calls for a return to simpler systems; B. 
OSTROM, “Court Tools: A Court Performance Framework”, Williamsburg, National Centre for State Courts, 
2006. 
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rather than as absolute data to be applied automatically. This approach seems more reasonable 
in part due to the difficulty of correctly interpreting the meaning of particular data or of all the 
information collected by these systems. It also offers opportunities of avoiding the risk that 
“managerial” values may prevail to the neglect of the other values which must be protected in 
the judicial processes. It is of particular importance, where one institutional value may be seen 
to trump the others, that the data be interpreted and the outcomes evaluated from the points of 




The public forms the rhetorical apex of the dual systems of accountability and 
authority. Both the judiciary and the other branches of government appeal to their position vis 
à vis the public, either as citizens authorising and respecting their authority or as the voters 
and taxpayers to whom they are accountable. If the ministry justifies the introduction of 
managerial accountability to show the taxpayers they are getting value for money (as in 
Austria), the judges protect their authority by appeals to judicial independence (as in Spain or 
France). That these appeals so often result in the zero sum games discussed above may be 
related to a paucity of reliable information about the wishes and beliefs of the public.  
 
A fundamental difficulty here is the vague meaning of the term public, including the 
‘people’ or the ‘People’, those manifestations of interested parties and sovereign will that we 
discussed previously. A great deal may ride on whether we view ‘the people’ as taxpayers, 
citizens, ‘clients’ of the court or ‘parties to an action’ before the court. It is possible to map 
some of these distinctions and thus to see the derivation of particular viewpoints, as we will 
have occasion to do shortly. The next step however is to review the traditional forms of public 
scrutiny of the courts and justice systems, as we have done with the traditional legal and 
managerial forms. 
 
The public gaze is a fundamental guarantee of the fairness of the trial and a ‘condition 
of justice’.75 The demand for public scrutiny of the judicial function was elucidated in the 
                                                
75 A. GARAPON, “Il Rituale Giudiziario”, supra note 26, pp. 289-305, at p. 302.  
Le Sueur refers to judges who appeal to these forms of accountability as ‘re-conceptualists’, since they are 
reconceiving traditional legal values and principles under the new demand for accountability; LE SUEUR, supra 
note 31, p. 76. 
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years immediately after the French Revolution when Mirabeau insisted to the Constituent 
Assembly that even the most corrupt judge could be trusted à la face du public.76 It was again 
defended in response to the crisis in the United States following the publicity of the O.J. 
Simpson trial, by the director of the American Judicature Society: “if the rule of law, and the 
independent judiciary that is required for it, are to be maintained, the public must support the 
legitimacy of these institutions [...] we believe that openness and public access is [sic] the 
ultimate guardian of fairness in our justice system”.77 This approach to public scrutiny is on 
the one hand a legal version of accountability: the public must see justice as being done. On 
the other hand it is a guarantee of judicial authority, so that “the public [...] support the 
legitimacy” of the courts.  
 
A third possible way to guarantee the openness of courts is through the direct 
involvement of the people in judicial decision making. In the countries considered in this 
research,78 this operates to improve the capacity of the court system to decide cases in specific 
matters (e.g., lay members of commercial or labour tribunals) or to improve the legitimacy of 
the decision in the most serious crimes (e.g., juries in the courts of assize), rather than to make 
judiciaries accountable to the people.  
 
Crises of legitimacy of justice systems may be almost endemic, as appears to be the 
case in Latin Europe, or they may be prompted by specific events. The most spectacular of 
these which our research encompasses was the public outcry over the Dutroux affair in 
Belgium. The bungled prosecution of Dutroux for child sex offences led in October 1996 to 
the massive demonstration known as the ‘marche blanche’, considered to be Belgium’s “most 
important protest march since the second World War”.79 The government and the justice 
                                                
76 “Donnez-moi le juge que voudrez, partial, corrupt, mon ennemi même, si vous voulez: peu m’importe pourvu 
qu’il ne puisse rien faire qu’à la face du public”; quoted in R.W. MILLAR, “The Formative Principles of Civil 
Procedure”, Illinois Law Review, 1923-24, pp. 1-36, 94-117 and 150-168.  
77 F.K. ZEMANS, “Public Access: Ultimate Guardian of Fairness in Our Justice System”, Judicature, 1996, pp. 
173-175.  
78 The role of lay judges and jurors varies considerably across the countries considered. As a general trend, juries 
are used mainly in panels with professional judges to try the most serious cases. But the involvement of lay 
people in judicial decision making also includes the appointment to labour and commercial courts of people who 
usually have some degree of knowledge on the subject to be decided, as in France and Austria, and the district 
court in Finland. Finally semi-professional judges, usually with some qualifications or experience in law, decide 
minor cases in countries such as Italy and Spain (justices of the peace). Portugal and the Netherlands have no lay 
judges. 
79 R. DEPRE and J. PLESSER, “Belgique”, in M. FABRI et al., L’administration de la justice en Europe et 
l’évaluation de sa qualité, Paris, Montchrestien, 2005; R. DEPRE and J. PLESSER, “Belgium”, 2005, p. 138. 
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system were obliged to respond to this political and legal crisis: a parliamentary commission 
as well as a number of internal inquiries were charged with investigating the sources of public 
discontent and recommending reforms. The diagnosis appears to have been summed up as 
“mal connu, mal aimé”, leading to attempts to bridge the perceived gulf between the courts 
and the public. While a considerable programme of reforms has been discussed in Belgium, 
the tangible results during the study period appear to have been limited to policies aimed at 
improving of the position of victims of crime and providing more information and better 
orientation to the courts and their processes for both victims and offenders.  
 
While critical events like the marche blanche can prompt urgent and unusual 
responses, the normal functioning of justice systems are oriented on one hand to fiscal 
accountability and on the other to “soft forms of accountability”,80 such as transparency 
measures which often amount to little more than leaving the courtroom door unlocked. In the 
absence of any genuine involvement by or reliable information from the public, the various 
mechanisms for ensuring internal accountability and the passive public gaze are deemed to 
guarantee adequate measures for reporting back to the people. As institutional checks on the 
authority of the people and accountability to the public, these legal and fiscal mechanisms 
operate with few means to register any dissenting views or take any action as a consequence. 
Parliamentary processes offer occasional channels for active scrutiny or public direction of the 
justice system. These have differing levels of access to the judges, the courts and the policies 
of the ministries or judicial councils, as will be seen in later examples. 
 
The experiences of the nine nations in the study provide useful examples of the need 
to gain information on the views of the public as a real, and not simply abstract, collectivity, 
and to see what consequences this information may have. In contrast to the well established 
techniques of evaluation embedded in the legal and the managerial traditions, those involving 
the public are indeterminate in both their origins and their outcomes. The uses of public 
opinion polls in evaluations of justice are common examples of research without 
consequences. Courts and justice ministries solicit opinions from the public and also use 
opinion polls which may be independent of the ministries. Many of the national reports 
referred to surveys of citizen confidence in the justice system, such as those of the regular 
                                                
80 W. VOERMANS, “Judicial Transparency Furthering Public Accountability for New Judiciaries”, Utrecht 
Law Review, 2007, p. 3.  
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‘Eurobarometer’ surveys of public opinion carried out by the European Union.81 These were 
most often cited by the Latin countries, where public appraisal puts the courts at the lowest 
end of the scale of public institutions. France and Italy rate their justice systems at or near the 
bottom of the scale of public satisfaction. The Spanish report notes that only in those two 
countries and Portugal do citizens rank their judiciary lower than they do in Spain, where only 
the politicians and their parties are lower on the scale of satisfaction than the courts.82 These 
broad public opinion surveys, though disturbing for the countries at the bottom of the scale 
and, no doubt, reassuring for those at the top, give little indication of where the problems lie, 
let alone what to do about them.  
 
Surveys of court users provide more detailed and potentially more useful information. 
Surveys in Finland indicate that court users are less satisfied with the courts than are citizens 
in general, while the converse is true of Spain.83 Since court users form their opinions from 
experience rather than by the public image or media representation of the courts, we would 
also expect them to be better informed. Well structured surveys of court users indicate in more 
detail just where the problems may lie. Themes emerging from surveys in France, Denmark, 
Portugal, Spain and Finland point variously to accessibility (cost and complexity), delay, 
fairness and judicial competence as issues of importance or concern to users.  
 
Of greater interest are some of the findings on fairness and competence of judges, in 
part because they begin to give us some insight into how the users evaluate these qualities. In 
Portugal court users were concerned at ‘favouritism’,84 while French users referred to 
‘inequality’ in the administration of justice (‘inégalité devant la justice’).85 These comments 
flag somewhat different public perceptions of judicial impartiality than the independence from 
executive government to which the judges traditionally refer. We return to this issue in more 
detail below.  
 
                                                
81 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm  
82 H.S. MUNOZ, “Qualité et Justice en Espagne”, in H. PAULIAT, The Administration of Justice in Europe: 
Towards the Development of Quality Standards, supra note 63, p. 158. 
83 Ibid., p. 162; AARNIO, supra note 43, p. 208. 
84 B. SOUSA-SANTOS, C. GOMES and J. PEDROSO, “Portugal”, in M.FABRI et al, L’administration de la 
justice en Europe et l’évaluation de sa qualité, Paris, Montchrestien, 2005, p. 335. 
85 DEFFIGIER, supra note 38, p.266. 
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Respondents in France and Portugal questioned the competence of judges in regard to 
the comprehensibility of their written decisions.86 In Spain there was concern that judges did 
not adequately understand the case before them.87 Data available from detailed surveys in 
Denmark proved to be useful in a controversy following a law professor’s criticisms of the 
inadequate reasoning of appeal court judgements. The critique focused on, but was not limited 
to, a particular case in which no reason was given for reducing a five year sentence to four 
years. A financial newspaper reported interviews with lawyers who said they were “shocked 
by badly written and incomprehensible explanatory statements” from one of the courts 
particularly criticised in the law professor’s article. The President of that court responded by 
quoting survey data which indicated 82% user satisfaction with court services, but only 59% 
satisfaction with judges’ explanatory statements.88 Here the data was relevant and available on 
a court by court basis, so it was actually available to address a particular controversy. The end 
result of that affair has been that the Judicial Council prepared “a new language policy [that] 
aims at establishing general guidelines for explanatory statements, which will make them 
more concise and comprehensible”.89 
 
Other instances in which informed public opinion has led to changed practices are 
seen in the Netherlands and again in Denmark. Both cases involved public concern over 
possible conflicts of interest among judges who were engaged in other employment, either as 
a sideline job (Denmark) or who were selected as part time “substitute” judges from among 
practising lawyers (Netherlands). In Denmark public reporting of sideline jobs in 2001 
indicated that judges were earning average additional incomes of €11,000 - €88,000 per 
annum (depending on the court), most of which came from private arbitration. Concern was 
based on whether such judges are deprived of adequate time for court work (which was denied 
by court presidents) or whether there were conflicts with impartiality.90 Impartiality was at the 
                                                
86 Ibid., p. 266; SOUSA-SANTOS, supra note 84, p. 335. 
87 MUÑOZ, supra note 63, p. 162. 
88 The President also invited dissatisfied lawyers to lodge formal complaints with the court. Complaints, and the 
mechanisms for handling them, form another means of evaluating justice systems, which fall between legal 
(including disciplinary) measures and administrative ones. They are also a means of gaining direct information 
from the public and lawyers using the courts.  
89 J. WITTRUP and P. SØRENSEN, “Quality and Justice in Denmark”, in M.FABRI, P. LANGBROEK and 
H. PAULIAT, The Administration of Justice in Europe: Towards the Development of Quality Standards, 
Bologna, Lo Scarabeo, 2003, p. 144. 
90 Ibid., pp. 131-132. An ironic aspect of this controversy is found in the remarks of the Director of the Council 
of the Judiciary who in 2000 told regional seminars of judges and clerical staff that one of the reasons for courts 
Vol.1 EJLS No. 2 32 
heart of public concerns in the Netherlands where a pressure group, Court Watch, investigated 
possible conflicts of interest, notably where a substitute judge may be hearing a case 
involving a colleague from the law firm in which they normally work. “Court Watch has 
forced the courts to publish the secondary functions of all their judges on the website for the 
judiciary”.91 
 
The ambivalence in judicial attitudes to public opinion, seen in Garapon’s 
characterisation of the public as both “guarantee and menace”92 is illustrated in confrontations 
between judicial decisions and public opinion. Controversies over inadequately harsh 
sentences for crimes, highlighted in the media, seem almost to be a ubiquitous, if not 
perennial phenomenon. National reports from France and Denmark reflect similar patterns of 
events and reactions in the two countries. In France this debate followed a reorganisation in 
2000 of the responsibilities of the juges d’instruction and the juges des libertés et de la 
détention (who deal with applications for alternatives to detention) which saw a marked 
decline in incarceration rates. Public reaction highlighted issues of security as a result of this 
decline, and, as the national report puts it, “the jurisprudence changed: the number of 
committals to provisional detention increased significantly, independent of any legislative 
change”.93 In Denmark the debate over sentencing for violent crime was heated, with judges 
accused of being “flabby humanitarians” by a member of Parliament. With the judges and the 
government resisting pressure for legislated mandatory minimum sentences, it was found that 
average sentences for violent crimes had increased from 87 days imprisonment in 1995 to 119 
in 2000. This data tracks changes following a 1994 legislative change which allowed harsher 
sentences.94 It is unclear how much of this change is attributable to legislation and how much 
to judicial responses to public opinion, as in France. The apparent accommodation of the 
judges to public opinion in these instances suggests that while it may be denigrated as 
“irrational” and formally discounted as a source of judicial decision-making, public opinion 
may operate in unacknowledged and unofficial ways.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
to improve their performance was that they were in competition with private sector providers of dispute 
resolution services [p. 140]. These are the competitors for whom the judges are working in their spare time. 
91 NG, supra note 6, p. 313. 
92 A. GARAPON, supra note 25, pp. 289-305, at p. 302. 
93 C. DEFFIGIER, supra note 38, p. 274. 
94 J.WITTRUP, supra note 76, p. 144-145. 
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We may draw some tentative conclusions from this brief summary of the role of the 
public in assessing and directing the justice systems under discussion. The public, in its 
various guises as citizens, voters, taxpayers and users of court services, has a legitimate 
interest in the quality of justice. Up to this point we have identified few initiatives which bring 
together that interest with any effective mechanisms for assessment and reform. Public 
opinion is often solicited in forms which have little relevance to policy implications and 
therefore few consequences for the reform of justice systems. When there are perceptions of a 
crisis of legitimacy or of deep-seated public criticisms of the justice system, responses are 
inconsistent. While often purporting to better inform the citizens as to the processes of justice, 
the nexus between information and outcomes remains tenuous. Judges pride themselves on 
their aloofness from public opinion while apparently accommodating it almost surreptitiously. 
The judiciary may well be as poorly informed about public opinion as the public is held to be 
about judicial processes. The information available to most justice systems (ministries, judges 
and judicial councils alike) is based on media reporting of crime, justice and public responses 
(through editorials or sound grabs) of dubious validity, and opinion polls of equally dubious 
relevance to key policy issues. 
 
The various forms of public input to the justice systems we have been reporting do, 
however, suggest some common themes and possible directions. When they are able to 
express views about substantive issues of justice, through well directed surveys or well 
informed pressure groups, public perceptions are more sophisticated than the “irrational” or 
“archaic and uncontrollable” mechanisms feared by the judges as the other face of the public 
guarantee of justice.95 Evidence from Portugal, France and Denmark shows that people truly 
desire to be better informed about the processes of justice through comprehensibly argued 
judicial decisions. This is clearly important to individual litigants, but also relevant on a 
broader scale to sentencing decisions. In addition we have seen that the users of the justice 
systems of the Netherlands, France, Portugal and Denmark consider the impartiality of judges 
to be important and threatened. Of particular and perhaps surprising interest is the nature of 
that impartiality and the source of its vulnerability. In contrast to the frequently expressed 
concern that the judiciary must maintain its independence from ministries or the interference 
of governments, the impartiality envisaged by the users has more to do with equality between 
the parties. This is threatened when judges have second jobs, which might mean working with 
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other lawyers who may appear before them, or when prosecutors are perceived to be working 
out of the same office as the judge. This is a simple and fundamental conception of 
impartiality which serves as a reminder that the separation of powers was never more than a 




The foregoing discussion of some current European practices employed in evaluating 
the quality of judicial activity within the context of the justice system has highlighted a 
number of difficulties. In conclusion we try to analyse certain factors underlying such 
problems in practice, and relate these to any indications of a possible way forward by 
reference to the earlier consideration of the principles upon which justice systems are based. A 
couple of the more promising examples arising from the research will again introduce a 
practical element to the discussion before we sum up with some tentative general proposals. 
 
The distinctive power bases of the key players involved in the delivery of justice are 
explicitly enshrined in the principle of the separation of powers. According to that doctrine, 
judges are to remain independent of the executive power and, a related issue, aloof from 
popular influences. As a principle of long official and even constitutional standing it 
underpins many of the institutional arrangements, as well as the habits of thought, obtaining in 
justice systems. Indeed, with the proliferation of judicial councils as a bulwark between the 
judiciary and the executive, the doctrine appears to be enjoying a period of particular 
influence. While powers should perhaps be separated through institutional internal divisions, 
evaluative mechanisms do not thrive on them. The research found many instances of 
unilateralism and entrenched opposition based precisely in these divisions of power. We have 
on many occasions referred to the zero sum games that result.  
 
The evaluation of quality and other means for ensuring accountability and conformity 
to standards of law and good practice are widely understood to be desirable and even essential 
to public management and to justice alike. Whether the pressures come from adverse findings 
of the ECHR, from parliaments demanding more formal and specific accountability, or from 
cash-strapped ministries, it often becomes obvious that new evaluative mechanisms must be 
implemented. When these have failed we have commonly noted one or two underlying 
factors: either a ritualistic adherence to some tenets of evaluative practice, or a more or less 
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cynical justification of the means by the ends. In the former case the mechanisms and 
processes take on a life of their own, so that increasingly elaborate data collection protocols 
(or measures, or information technology) are understood as the solution to problems which 
really arise in the very conception of the process. Losing sight of the goals of the evaluation 
system, as of the justice system itself, attention shifts to the minutiae of the data and away 
from the purpose for which it was required in the first place.  
 
If ritualism mistakes means for ends, a narrow focus on the quick fix makes the 
converse error. With sufficient will, power and cunning, a technological solution may be 
imposed on many different problems. The Italian Pinto legislation is illustrative: through a 
combination of domestic legal devices and the promise of compensation, appeals to the ECHR 
on the grounds of delay were reduced without reducing the delay itself. Less spectacular 
examples of technical solutions to juridical, managerial and political problems were seen in 
the automatic connections made by some justice ministries (Austria) and judicial councils 
(Spain) between evaluative devices and financial allocation. The Spanish system of output 
measures as a basis for judicial remuneration illustrates both ritualism and technologism: on 
the one hand, the measuring system becomes an end in itself, losing sight of the purposes for 
which it exists. On the other hand, the results of that measurement are applied mathematically 
to financial outputs. By focussing the attention of the judges on their salaries, of the ministry 
on the measures, and of both interest groups on the nexus between the two, any broader 
interests or ends are effectively eclipsed. 
 
Some potential solutions to these problems can be illustrated by some practical 
examples from the research. Before turning to those we briefly revisit our earlier analysis of 
the principles underlying justice systems to see what guidance they may offer. We saw that 
both authority and accountability are means of representing interests which cannot literally be 
present in a practical setting such as a court or a ministry. The ministries and courts represent 
the traditional sources of authority of the state and of law. Modern democracies also base the 
legitimate authority of the state and the judiciary in the will and confidence of the people, who 
are also represented as an abstraction, or in a few cases as a jury or citizen judge. The 
representation of law, state and a sovereign people prospectively authorises courts to pass 
judgment on those real persons before the court who stand to lose property or liberty as a 
consequence. The authority of the entire system must stand above the interests of the parties, 
including the victims of crime, while being based in the represented abstraction, the people. 
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This paradoxical relationship between justice and the public leads to various devices for 
keeping popular interests at arms length. Continually represented only as an abstraction, the 
will of the people can be formally canvassed in opinion polls, or informally (and unreliably) 
deduced from the media. In keeping a distance between themselves and actual people with 
interests, judges and justice systems may lose sight of the legitimate interests of people as 
users of the courts. Where those interests have been able to communicate effectively we have 
seen demands for timely justice, competent and communicative judges, and transparent 
judicial impartiality. We discovered more vocal citizen concern over judges’ connections with 
the private interests of parties (through their other appointments, as in the Netherlands and 
Denmark) than with those of public authorities.  
 
Accountability is a retrospective check on the representativeness of the justice system. 
This does not imply that it should be any less broad in its conception of the interests to which 
it must answer. Substantive issues of timeliness, competence, communication and impartiality 
are as central to the system of accountability as to that of authority. Courts are only 
accountable to the executive as a means to the end of accounting to the citizens. And as we see 
in this overview of citizens’ concerns, they are accountable for a great deal more than money. 
 
This brief overview of the principles which underlie the evaluation of judges in 
context bear out the issues we identified in practice: the balkanisation of interests within the 
justice systems; the ritualism of seeking evaluative mechanisms for their own sake; and the 
search for a quick technological fix which will have assured or automatic outcomes. This 
syndrome is collectively characterised by an approach blinkered by partial interests and a 
hiatus between means and ends, so losing sight of the underlying aims and principles of the 
justice system. Evaluative mechanisms must take into account a complex of interests and 
values, not losing sight of their diverse sources in the judges, office and ministry personnel, 
citizens, lawyers, victims of crime and other court users. As long as many of these interests 
are represented as abstractions, the views and interests of real persons can only be adduced 
from the media or as a by-product of technical data collection. That these interests often enter 
into the debate only as representations of overarching demands for accountability versus 
independence stifles broader debate. If it were possible to find ways for citizens, lawyers, 
politicians, judges and public servants to work together to define the goals and priorities of the 
justice system, this may help to reattach the ends of the justice with the means of evaluation.  
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If that suggestion seems utopian, it may be opportune to return to some practical 
examples arising out of the research which, we believe, point in some positive directions. We 
must explore the extent to which various institutional actors may be involved in assessing and 
implementing proposals that have a broader base than their own immediate institutional 
environment. We see progress in those areas where the demands of the public are heard, and 
when judges and managers work together to respond to those demands as well as to 
understand each others’ values, interests and modes of representation.  
 
In addition to the Finnish experience of national management by results considered 
above, it is worth drawing attention to a local pilot scheme. This was begun in 1999 in the 
district of the Rovaniemi Court of Appeal (which includes nine first instance district courts) 
where quality targets were set by a Development Committee of the Quality Project whose 
members are judges, practising lawyers and prosecutors. The committee worked through a 
process that involved frequent communications among the judges, and between the judges and 
the various stakeholder groups. These communications included an increased dialogue among 
judges on court practices, the formation of working groups, annual quality conferences and 
the preparation of quality benchmarks.96 One of the results is the development of a new 
culture of communication between all the actors involved in the judicial process. 
 
The targets dealt with substantive legal and judicial management issues, and were able 
to be assessed by fairly straightforward measures. They included increased consistency in 
sentencing (initially in theft, drink driving and assault, expanded to narcotics cases the 
following year), overcoming impediments to the preparation of civil cases (in consultation 
with lawyers), leadership skills in the admission of evidence, improvement in the quality of 
written judgements and increasing participation in judicial training (to 100%) with some 
expansion of postgraduate study. Not only was this an innovative local quality assurance pilot 
scheme, but it was itself evaluated,97 with such positive results that it was recommended for 
                                                
96 “Quality Project in the Courts in the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal of Rovaniemi, Finland”, 2005. 
http://www.oikeus.fi/uploads/wz1uke8tvs.pdf [accessed on 6 March 2006]. 
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nationwide adoption and was awarded a European prize for “innovative practice contributing 
to the quality of civil justice”.98  
 
In contrast to the various arrangements, noted throughout this article, by which the 
judiciary, the ministry and, occasionally, the parliament act unilaterally and without regard to 
each others’ interests and values, recent developments in Denmark have been dynamic and 
exemplary. With the introduction into Parliament of the bill to establish a Judicial Council 
there was extensive debate between the Ministry, the Parliament and the General Public 
Auditor on the allocation of funds and the responsibility of the Council. The Parliamentary 
opposition and the Auditor (who is independent but reports to Parliament) considered that the 
Auditor’s office should have the same powers and responsibilities in relation to the courts and 
the Judicial Council as apply to any public agency. This being conceded, the stumbling block 
became the sanctions that could be imposed upon an independent judicial council in the event 
that there were irregularities in its accounting for resources. The Council was established in 
1999 on the basis that the Auditor can criticise and instruct the Council to take any measures 
agreed with the Minister, who can dismiss the entire Council if it does not comply with such 
instructions.99 These arrangements were put to the test soon enough when, in 2000, the 
Auditor and the Ministry of Finance criticised the productivity of certain district courts. In 
response to these concerns the Judicial Council developed goals and introduced and evaluated 
a new district court reporting regime including productivity measures and targets which led to 
a 10% productivity increase. The process implemented by the Council includes qualitative 
comment back from the courts, which has allowed improvements in the data collection. This 
has consequences in decisions to fill vacancies, models for court staffing, and flow-through to 
non-salary expenses. The Auditor is now satisfied with the arrangements put in place by the 
Council.100 
 
Key issues emerging from these examples revolve around what is to be measured, who 
is to decide what those measures should be, and how to negotiate what consequences should 
flow from the outcomes. Local initiatives, as in the case of the Finnish Rovaniemi district, 
have the advantage that the objectives are set by the same personnel who are to implement 
                                                
98AARNIO, supra note 39, pp. 181-182,  http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Legal_co-operation/Operation_ 
of_justice/Efficiency_of_justice/Finalists%20E.asp#TopOfPage [accessed in March 2006]. 
99 J. WITTRUP, supra note 76, p. 125. 
100 Ibid., pp. 128-129. 
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them. While this makes for optimum levels of commitment and responsiveness, it does not 
necessarily ensure accountability. At the other extreme, then, objectives are set by the 
Ministry (as in the case of the French performance measures discussed above) or by 
Parliament (Finnish national system) and the courts are required to meet them to maintain 
their flow of resources. Between these two systems we find various means of negotiating 
objectives between the courts and auditors, ministries or parliaments. Where these objectives 
are purely related to managerial accountability, as in the case of the Danish Auditor, they are 
limited to quantitative productivity measures. They may also be used as tools of policy which 
again brings us back to the question of who is to determine the policy directions to be pursued 
by the courts.  
 
The traditional lines of responsibility of judges and managers have been challenged in 
many of the instances of evaluation considered by the research projects. This may derive from 
the application of new public management principles to the operation of courts. It has also 
been stimulated by institutional reforms such as the establishment of judicial councils (as in 
the Netherlands and Denmark). These innovative approaches, in which judges are expected to 
respond to managerial criteria, or managers to public criteria (to suggest two of the possible 
combinations) are more interesting but also riskier than some of the one dimensional 
procedures we discussed earlier. The most successful modes of evaluation which this research 
identified were those combining the methods or claims coming from different institutional 
positions. A common element in successful evaluation regimes with positive outcomes has 
been the communication between players and the respect for a wider range of values and 
interests. The involvement of the parliament or court users has helped to overcome the 
stalemate between a judiciary relying on authority and a narrowly conceived independence, 
confronting a ministry or judicial council claiming the supreme importance of accountability 
conceived in a narrow fiscal and managerial sense. The role of the public has been most 
effective when it is represented by a well informed lobby group (e.g. Court Watch in the 
Netherlands). Across the various Danish examples we have mentioned, effective public 
participation has included lawyers and a legal academic, the media and the parliament. Public 
participation is least effective when the demands are vague and there is little or no follow 
through (as in Belgium). The public can act as a circuit-breaker to the usual zero-sum games.  
 
Analysing the quality of justice from the different points of view of the institutional 
and public interests, it is clear that courts cannot be evaluated according to a single dimension. 
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The criteria to be applied must recognise the distinctive approaches to representation which 
we found underlying both authority and accountability, and need to be negotiated among these 
diverse and possibly competing interests. While each of the criteria or interests has legitimate, 
and in many cases established, means of evaluating justice from its specific point of view, we 
have discovered the most promising examples to be those in which the stakeholders represent 
their own and respect each others’ overlapping interests. They negotiate the assessment 
criteria and the uses to which they are put, and each has a stake in achieving successful 
outcomes.  
 
